Tongwei

Business

Tongwei (通威股份有限公司) runs two unrelated businesses: animal and fish feed, and solar. In solar it makes polysilicon at plants in Leshan, Baotou and Baoshan, solar cells in Shuangliu, Jintang and Meishan, and modules (2026 interim report, p. 8). It says its polysilicon and cells have held the largest global market share for many years, and that its modules rank in the global top five by shipments (p. 9). Its cells go to its own module business and to other module makers, which it says include the world's ten largest (p. 8).

It also builds "fishery-solar" plants that put solar panels over fish ponds (p. 8).

Solar in the first half of 2026

• Polysilicon shipments were about 155,300 tonnes (p. 11).
• Cell sales were 34.78 GW. The company says it is the first cell maker to pass 400 GW of cumulative shipments (p. 11).
• Module sales were 13.07 GW, with the overseas share rising to nearly 40% (p. 11).
• It put a new TOPCon cell and module generation, TNC 3.0, into mass production, with module output up to 670 W, and is developing heterojunction (HJT), back-contact and perovskite tandem cells in parallel (p. 11).

Results and margins

• Revenue fell 15.19% to ¥34.36bn, and the net loss attributable to shareholders was ¥5.12bn, against ¥4.96bn a year earlier (p. 6).
• Solar products brought in ¥19.65bn at a cost of ¥22.06bn, a gross margin of about -12.2%. Feed and food products brought in ¥14.35bn at about 9.0% (our calculations from p. 144).
• Sichuan Yongxiang, the subsidiary that holds the polysilicon business, lost ¥4.06bn on revenue of ¥5.23bn. The cell subsidiary, Tongwei Solar, lost ¥1.37bn on ¥11.50bn (p. 17).
• Asset impairment losses were ¥2.05bn (p. 51).
• Operating cash flow was a positive ¥109m, against an outflow of ¥1.95bn a year earlier, which the company puts down to a smaller build-up of inventory (p. 12). It held about ¥26.4bn of cash and trading financial assets at the end of June (p. 10).

The company says the feed business keeps contributing steady profit and cash flow (p. 20).

The company's own caveats

• Prices below cost. It says prices across the main solar chain have fallen below the industry's cost line, that the major solar companies have been losing money for a long time, and that capacity exits are inevitable (p. 19).
• Policy at home. Changes to land rules and power market trading in China directly affect installations and demand (p. 19).
• Technology. TOPCon is the mainstream cell technology, but HJT and back-contact (xBC) cells keep advancing (p. 19).
• Trade. It cites growing trade barriers against Chinese solar products, led by the US since 2024 (p. 19).